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Testimonial Injustice and Vulnerability: 
A Qualitative Analysis of Participation 
in the Court of Protection 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article explores participation in Court of Protection (COP) proceedings by people 
considered vulnerable. The paper is based on original data obtained from observing 
COP proceedings and reviewing COP case files. It is argued that the observed 
absence of the subject of proceedings is a form of testimonial injustice, that is, a 
failure to value a person in their capacity as a giver of knowledge. The issue of 
competence to give evidence is considered but it is argued that it is not the formal 
evidential rules that prohibit a vulnerable adult from giving evidence. Instead, it is the 
result of a persistent assumption that they are inherently vulnerable and therefore lack 
credibility as a knowledge giver. This assumption results in the voices of vulnerable 
adults being routinely absent from legal proceedings. It is argued that having a voice 
in the courtroom is essential and has a number of intrinsic and instrumental benefits. 
The paper concludes with a discussion about the implications of the research, 
including the current trend towards the increased use of special measures, and 
recommends a presumption in favour of the subject of COP proceedings giving 
evidence. 
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Introduction 
 
The value of participation has been recognised across a range of legal contexts from 
criminal to family to human rights law. Involving people in decisions that affect them 
better respects their autonomy and may alter the outcome. Despite the benefits, a 
participatory approach has not sufficiently taken hold in mental capacity law. The 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) allows for decisions to be made on behalf of adults 
where they lack the capacity to make decisions for themselves. Under ss. 2-3 MCA a 
person may be found to lack capacity to make a decision if they have ‘an impairment 
of, or disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain’ which means they are 
unable to understand, retain, or use or weigh the information relevant to the decision, 
or communicate that decision to others. If a person lacks capacity, a decision can be 
made on that adult’s behalf in their best interests (s 1 (5) and s 4 MCA). The Court of 
Protection (COP), the court that deals with disputes under the MCA, therefore makes 
decisions that can have a profound impact on a person’s life, ranging from decisions 
about medical treatment to decisions about where to live and who to marry. The COP 
even has the power to make a prospective statement that, for example, a person lacks 
the capacity to engage in sexual activity whereas the criminal law cannot prevent a 
person from engaging in sex except to the extent they are imprisoned.1 Therefore the 
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mental capacity law jurisdiction is an important site of research because of the 
restrictive interventions that can result.  
There have been discussions around participation under the MCA since it 
came into force, including analyses of the participatory potential of the best interests 
approach and the challenges of implementing participation (Donnelly, 2009; Butler-
Cole and Hobey-Hamsher, 2016; Series et al. 2017). This paper builds on those 
discussions specifically focusing on the participation of the subject of COP 
proceedings, referred to as ‘P’, using original data obtained from my observational 
research at the COP. The subject matter of the cases analysed cover capacity to: 
consent to sex, marry and decide on contact with others. This is the first published 
qualitative study of participation in the COP, which is the court that resolves disputes 
under the civil law framework of the MCA. Historically the COP has been a private 
court and only recently have the public been granted access, initially via the Court of 
Protection Practice Direction - Transparency Pilot and a subsequent change in the 
Court of Protection Rules 2017. This research therefore sheds light on a previously 
concealed area of practice and provides an original insight into COP proceedings to 
highlight the injustice of P’s limited participation.  
The reasons underpinning the value of participation are explored in the first 
part of this article before the methods used for the research are outlined. Following 
that, I frame the conceptual approach of the article through a lens of testimonial 
injustice and vulnerability. Developing the link between testimonial injustice and 
vulnerability theory, I identify and critique P’s absence from proceedings as a form of 
testimonial injustice, which is the failure to value a person in their ‘capacity as a giver 
of knowledge’ (Fricker, 2007: 7). I further explore the reasons why P is absent from 
COP proceedings, focusing on the cultural assumption that P is especially and 
inherently vulnerable. This culture of the court process frames mentally disabled 
witnesses as lacking in credibility and as especially harmed by attending court. The 
article concludes with a discussion about the wider implications of the research, 
particularly the use of special measures as a way of facilitating participation in legal 
proceedings. In contributing to this debate, I suggest that the use of special measures 
alone will do little to improve P’s participation in mental capacity law.  
 
The Importance of Participation 
 
Participation in legal proceedings is an important part of justice. It requires that a 
person is facilitated to take part in decision-making which affects them (Donnelly and 
Kilkelly, 2011). Participation does not require that the individual has complete control 
of the decision-making process. In discussing participation, I am not arguing for an 
individual’s decision-making autonomy to be respected in the substantive sense, 
because their decision or wishes may ultimately be overruled. However, involving a 
person in decisions which affect them is still important for intrinsic and instrumental 
reasons. As procedural justice theorists have established, participation in decision-
making can have positive effects for the individuals involved and can enhance a 
person’s sense of control over their life, even if the decision does not accord with 
their wishes (Tyler, 1990; Winick, 1994). This is particularly important in mental 
capacity law because there is a capacity binary such that individuals are deemed to 
either have capacity to make a decision or not, whereas a person’s understanding is a 
matter of degree. Even if a person is held to lack capacity to make a decision, she is 
still likely to have an important contribution to make (Donnelly, 2009: 11-12). Whilst 
concerns might be raised about the superficial nature of participation should the 
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individual’s wishes be ignored, at the very least hearing P indicates to her that she is a 
part of the decision-making process. Furthermore, participation must be encouraged 
in a meaningful way, hence the emphasis I place throughout on P providing sworn 
evidence.   
Involving the person about whom the decision is being made also has 
instrumental benefits. The decision-making process is improved (Donnelly, 2009) and 
it may enable the person to engage better with the decision. For example, evidence 
shows that a person is likely to be less resistant to the outcome if they have been 
involved in the decision-making process (Dennis and Monahan, 1996). In mental 
capacity law cases this concern is heightened because the investigation of capacity is 
often the purpose of proceedings. This means that any assumption of lack of capacity 
as a reason for P’s exclusion violates the principle that capacity must be presumed 
under s 1 (2) MCA. Furthermore, courts are likely to have a wider range of 
information on which to base their decision if the person is involved, thereby 
improving the decision-making process. It is therefore possible that hearing the 
person at the centre of the case could change the outcome. For instance, CC v KK and 
STCC [2012] EWHC 2136 concerned an 82 year old woman who lived in a nursing 
home but wanted to return home to live in her bungalow. Baker J heard oral evidence 
from KK and found that she had the capacity to make decisions as to her residence 
and care, contrary to expert evidence which found that she lacked the capacity to 
make those decisions. In discussing KK’s evidence at para 73 he explained: 
 
Overall, I found in her oral testimony clear evidence that she has a 
degree of discernment and that she is not simply saying that she 
wants to go home without thinking about the consequences. 
 
Baker J repeatedly referred to KK’s evidence2 and hearing her appeared to make a 
difference to the outcome. Evidence can be conveyed by others on P’s behalf. 
However, the individual is likely to possess more complete information about their 
own life because they are most closely situated to it. That is why hearsay evidence is 
given less weight –3  because it is not based on direct knowledge of phenomena. 
Accurate knowledge cannot be gained without the individual’s input and some may 
lack insight into their own experiences. However, the focus should be on 
communicating with the individual because they are closer to the truth and without 
their evidence there is a risk that important information will be omitted. Additionally, 
if P is not able to put forward her own knowledge, the evidence of others may be 
preferred. In fact, this can be seen in cases where the judge has met with P, which 
have different outcomes from those where the expert evidence alone is relied upon.4 
In cases such as CC v KK and STCC, KK’s testimony was given greater weight 
because Baker J met with her directly. It is difficult to know what the outcome would 
have been in the absence of KK’s direct evidence, but case law suggests that hearing 
P’s voice has an impact on proceedings.  
In some areas, courts have increasingly taken a participatory approach, even 
for individuals typically characterised as ‘vulnerable’. The criminal courts are 
arguably the most participatory with Brammer and Cooper stating that ‘criminal 
courts are highly likely to hear direct evidence from the child who is the victim of an 
alleged offence’ (2011: 925). Furthermore, it would be highly unusual for a defendant 
in a criminal case not to be present at hearings and their attendance is fundamentally 
linked to their Article 6 right to a fair trial under the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). Adverse inferences can also be drawn from a defendant’s failure to 
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give evidence under s 35 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. The serious 
implications for a defendant who wishes to remain silent means that defendants are 
given the opportunity to be heard should they wish to do so. There is much greater 
emphasis placed by the criminal courts on participation than in the COP even though 
the implications of findings of incapacity can be just as severe, for example a person 
who lacks capacity can be deprived of their liberty, prevented from having a sexual 
relationship or getting married. This reflects the difference in culture between the 
jurisdictions.  
Changes to participation in family law proceedings have been slower to take 
hold. For example, for some time the consensus appeared to be that children should 
rarely give evidence in family cases (Brammer and Cooper, 2011). However, this 
changed following Re W [2010] UKSC 12, in which Baroness Hale explained at para 
22: 
 
The existing law erects a presumption against a child giving 
evidence… That cannot be reconciled with the approach of the 
European Court of human Rights… Striking that balance in care 
proceedings may well mean that the child should not be called to 
give evidence in the great majority of cases, but that is a result and 
not a presumption or even a starting point. 
 
Whilst participation is yet to be fully secured in family law, there is a change in court 
culture taking place towards facilitating participation for vulnerable witnesses. For 
example, in Wigan Council v M, C, P, GM, G, B and CC [2015] EWFC 8 Jackson J 
held that whilst expert evidence may be appropriate to determine capability of 
children to give evidence, it is not always necessary. That decision reinforced the 
importance of obtaining evidence directly from individuals who are impacted by the 
decision rather than relying on the evidence or opinion of ‘objective’ others, such as 
experts. Balancing expert evidence against evidence from experience may not always 
be easy. However, having the opportunity to hear evidence from individuals who are 
directly impacted by the case at least provides the court with a wider range of 
information and acknowledges the intrinsic value of participation to the individual.  
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) similarly explored the value 
of personal presence in legal proceedings in Shtukaturov v Russia (2012) 54 E.H.R.R. 
27, which concerned an adult with a history of mental illness who inherited property 
from his grandmother. His mother applied to the court seeking to deprive her son of 
his legal capacity on the basis of a psychiatric report. The district court concluded that 
the applicant was legally incapable, despite the fact that he was not present for 
proceedings, was not aware of them and was only informed of the judgment by 
chance around a year later. The applicant subsequently wished to challenge this 
decision but was prohibited from having contact with his lawyer. The ECtHR held 
unanimously that there had been a violation of articles 5(1) and 5(4), 6 and 8. In 
particular they stated, at para 73: 
 
In such circumstances it was indispensable for the judge to have at 
least a brief visual contact with the applicant, and preferably to 
question him. The Court concludes that the decision of the judge to 
decide the case on the basis of documentary evidence, without 
seeing or hearing the applicant, was unreasonable and in breach of 
the principle of adversarial proceedings enshrined in art.6 (1). 
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Shtukaturov is not an exceptional case in this context, an observation that will be 
evidenced throughout. Whilst the COP introduced Rule 3A Court of Protection Rules 
2007 (COPr)5 which led to P routinely being joined as a party to proceedings, it 
remains rare for P to participate in proceedings in any meaningful way, for example 
by giving evidence or attending court. Despite improvements to participation in 
human rights, criminal and family law, it will be shown that P’s participation in 
mental capacity law proceedings has not yet been secured.  
 
Methods 
 
The data used in this article were obtained from qualitative research carried out at the 
COP. The research was given approval by the Ministry of Justice to commence in 
November 2015 and finished in December 2016. The COP research involved two 
aspects; firstly, observing proceedings relating to eight cases over eleven hearings. 
Secondly, the research involved a review of a purposive sample of 20 
sex/marriage/contact COP case files selected by court staff. From January 2016 staff 
selected case files that were issued or ongoing and which concerned capacity to 
consent to sex, capacity to marry and capacity to decide on contact with others. These 
files were required to be selected by court staff as a condition of the approval. Once 
the sample limit of 20 was reached in May 2016, no further cases were included. 
Cases for observation were selected from the sample of 20 case files. The research 
was approved by the University of Birmingham Research Ethics Committee, the 
Ministry of Justice and the Vice President of the COP, Mr Justice Charles. The COP 
staff sent information about the research to all parties in each case observed on my 
behalf. On the day each judge also gave their approval for me to observe and ensured 
that participants did not object. Observational research was selected to enable me to 
become immersed within the culture of proceedings (Jacob, 2012) as well as to 
explore factors which are often obscured by reported judgments, such as participation, 
the language used by participants and the set-up of the courtroom. Verbatim notes 
were made during observations, with additional notes typed up afterwards. Notes 
were also made from a review of case files, using a case file review template. All data 
is anonymised throughout. 
 
Testimonial Injustice and P’s Vulnerability  
 
Despite the importance of participation, the data obtained confirm P’s routine absence 
from COP proceedings. Fricker’s concept of testimonial injustice gets to the core of 
this problem; that P is excluded from the practice of conveying her knowledge 
(Fricker, 2007). Whilst knowledge can be gained independently of experience, having 
experience of phenomena can strengthen understanding (Collins and Evans, 2008). 
Being silenced is the most basic form of testimonial injustice – the inability to 
communicate your knowledge to another. I use this concept to argue that P’s limited 
participation in COP proceedings is a form of testimonial injustice against her, 
motivated by concerns about her especial, inherent vulnerability.  
Fricker’s theory focuses on testimonial injustice caused by prejudice, with 
such attitudes leading to the speaker’s credibility being underestimated; this lack of 
(or reduced) credibility leads to their knowledge being ignored or devalued (Fricker, 
2007). Fricker describes testimonial injustice to be the result of intentional prejudice, 
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rather than of bad luck or ‘innocent error’ (Fricker, 2007: 21). From my interactions 
with court staff, judges, lawyers and others, most, if not all, did not appear actively 
prejudiced against P, nor were they motivated by a desire to deny her the opportunity 
to speak. Those who raised concerns about P giving evidence primarily expressed it in 
relation to the detrimental effect that they perceived giving evidence might have on 
her. This paternalistic attitude appeared to be part of the culture of the COP; that 
participants assumed that P needed to be protected for her own good because her 
disability made her especially vulnerable to the harm of attending court. Such 
concerns did not typically arise in response to P giving evidence and having that 
evidence discounted. Instead she was pre-emptively silenced (Fricker, 2007: 130) as a 
result of assumptions that mentally disabled people are ‘too vulnerable’ to participate 
in legal proceedings.  
Concerns about the paternalistic nature of responses under the MCA are clear 
in judgments6 and academic commentaries (Doyle, 2010; Taylor, 2016). Adults with 
mental disabilities have long been the subject of paternalistic interventions because of 
their perceived especial vulnerability (Shakespeare, 2006; Clough, 2015). This 
suggests that those who argue we should be wary of vulnerability discourse might 
have legitimate concerns. For example, Munro and Scoular have warned the language 
of vulnerability can be used to justify surveillance and intervention against groups 
who are labelled ‘vulnerable’ (Munro and Scoular, 2012). Similarly, it has been 
argued that the vulnerable/invulnerable dichotomy adopted by law obscures the varied 
experiences of vulnerability in peoples’ lives (Mant and Wallbank, 2017). However, 
vulnerability has been theorised in recent years in a more nuanced way, particularly 
by feminist scholars (Fineman, 2008; Fineman; 2010; Clough, 2014; Mackenzie, 
2014; Mackenzie et al., 2014). In using the term ‘vulnerability’ in this article, I adopt 
an embodied understanding, which takes into account the variety of sources of 
vulnerability. In this sense vulnerability means being in ‘a state of constant possibility 
of harm’ (Fineman, 2008: 11) but also incorporates the possibility that vulnerability 
varies between individuals and in different situational contexts within an individual’s 
life. In particular, I distinguish between inherent and situational vulnerability 
(Mackenzie, 2014; Mackenzie et al., 2014; Lindsey, 2016) as a way to refocus legal 
responses on addressing the embodied vulnerability present in a given case, rather 
than labelling groups as vulnerable because of their inherent features, such as their 
disability. 
The concepts of inherent and situational vulnerability are also used as a way of 
framing the different types of vulnerability identified by COP participants 
(Mackenzie, 2014; Mackenzie et al., 2014). Vulnerability was viewed as inherent in 
this context because it was perceived to emanate from internal features. In this sense P 
was assumed to be inherently vulnerable because of her mental disability, which had 
two main consequences. Firstly, she rarely had her voice heard or attended 
proceedings. Secondly, her perceived inherent vulnerability led to her credibility 
being questioned, both before and after her voice was heard. Yet inherent 
vulnerability was over-emphasised in contrast to acknowledging the universal 
vulnerabilities that we all share (Fineman, 2008; Fineman, 2010). This assumption of 
inherent vulnerability underpins the findings I set out in this article. 
The focus on P’s inherent vulnerability also highlighted the difference 
between the especial vulnerability attributed to P, despite that attending court is a 
vulnerable experience for many people. This concern exemplifies the concept of 
situational vulnerability that I also use. Situational vulnerability relates to the 
circumstance-specific causes of vulnerability, such as environmental, social, relational 
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and economic causes. In this context, P was situationally vulnerable where it was 
acknowledged that attending court would be a scary and intimidating experience. 
However, this form of situational vulnerability was seen as especially harmful to P, 
whereas the courtroom is likely to be a universally vulnerability inducing experience. 
I therefore argue throughout this article that by labelling P as especially vulnerable 
(inherently and situationally), she was wronged in her capacity as a possessor of 
knowledge. 
 
Embodiment and Voice in the Court of Protection  
 
In this section I set out the findings that emerged from the data. I show that P rarely 
attended COP proceedings or gave witness evidence. I present this as a form of 
testimonial injustice, caused by paternalistic attitudes about P’s especial inherent 
vulnerability, which was embedded in the culture of the COP.   
 
Embodiment and Court of Protection proceedings  
 
The value of having P’s embodied presence in COP proceedings should not be 
underestimated. Firstly, P has direct experience of her condition and the impact it has 
on her life. This can be conveyed to the court and other participants through her 
presence. For example, a person’s character and body language can become clearer in 
their physical presence (Burton et al., 2007: 7). Whereas if COP participants do not 
engage with mentally disabled adults, if they do not understand the embodied context 
within which P lives, their own experience about what constitutes ‘normal’ 
embodiment risks becoming normative (Scully, 2012: 140). As a result they may use 
their own experience as the benchmark from which to judge if they are not faced with 
the reality of differently embodied people. In the context of mental capacity, this 
could mean a failure to understand the importance of the provision of support in 
decision-making as well as a failure to recognise the abilities and life goals that many 
adults with mental disabilities also have despite their disability. Secondly, a person’s 
presence in the courtroom also reminds participants that there is a person at the heart 
of the legal case. P’s presence can force a cultural shift from an exclusive focus on 
abstract legal doctrine towards acknowledging the lived reality for those involved in 
the case and the consequences of their decision on an identifiable individual before 
them (Fletcher et al., 2008: 323).  
Despite the value of embodied presence, P’s absence was the most striking 
theme that emerged from the data. Of the eight cases observed over 11 hearings, P 
was present on three occasions. Of the case files reviewed, there was no evidence that 
P attended any hearings, gave evidence or spoke to the judge informally. Whilst I did 
not attend all hearings for each case, it is widely accepted that it is unusual for P to 
attend or give evidence in the COP (Butler-Cole and Hobey-Hamsher, 2016; Series et 
al., 2017). Accordingly I would have expected attendance to be noted in court files. 
The COP had attempted to increase P’s participation through the enactment of 
Rule 3A COPr, which makes provision under Practice Direction 2A para 2 to ‘ensure 
that in every case the question of what is required to ensure that P’s “voice” is 
properly before the court is addressed’. The primary focus has been on joining P as a 
party but Rule 3A (2) (d) COPr also allows for the judge to order that P address her. 
Similarly, even if P is deemed to lack competence to give evidence, she can still 
provide information to the court under COPr 95 (d) and COPr 95 (e). For example, in 
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Re M [2013] EWHC 3456 a District Judge visited P in her care home and made a 
written record of the meeting. However, evidence given in this manner is usually 
unsworn, limiting its weight, which can have important consequences. For example, 
in Y County Council v (1) LC (2) GK (3) SC, a case I observed over the course of 
three hearings and discussed in more detail below, the judge noted that if he did not 
hear directly from LC then if asked to rely on anything she has said to others, the 
weight given to such evidence would be small. He also explained that if LC spoke to 
him in private then ‘I won’t be able to hear evidence from her’. This suggests that it is 
in P’s interests to give evidence in court otherwise her opinions will be given less 
weight than those relaying the same information on her behalf. In this respect, there is 
a need for P’s bodily presence in court so that she can provide sworn evidence, which 
will have the greatest evidential weight. Yet neither rule 3A nor COPr 95 were used 
to enable P’s participation in any cases observed. This was disappointing given that 
the COP formally appeared to be making progress towards addressing P’s limited 
participation through the enactment of new rules. This highlights that barriers to 
participation are not always easy to identify (McNay, 2012: 234) because the legal 
rules are facilitative of P’s participation, but instead the obstacles form part of the 
culture of the court process. 
P’s absence was striking in Y County Council v (1) LC (2) GK (3) SC. The 
case concerned LC’s capacity to marry and consent to sexual relations. LC was a 
young woman in her early twenties described as having autism and a mild learning 
disability. LC married a man, GK, without the knowledge of LC’s family, despite 
having a close relationship and living with her mother, SC. There were also ongoing 
criminal investigations into GK’s alleged rape of LC. An application was made to the 
COP following a safeguarding investigation, which raised concerns about LC lacking 
the capacity to marry GK, thereby making it ‘forced’ under s 63A (4) Forced 
Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007. In particular there were concerns that GK 
married LC to obtain a spousal visa to remain in the UK. In hearing one, counsel for 
the Official Solicitor, on behalf of LC, explained that there was a letter from LC 
explaining she did not wish to participate and that she was stressed by proceedings. In 
hearing two, counsel for the Official Solicitor explained that LC expressed a wish to 
attend court and speak to the judge but not give evidence. However, the hearing was 
adjourned and LC’s participation was not pursued. At the final hearing counsel for the 
Official Solicitor indicated that LC would like to see the judge in private ‘in order to 
express her wishes and feelings’. In response the judge explained this was a ‘grey 
area’ and that he could not take evidence from LC if he met her in private. 
Furthermore, on the evidence he had heard, LC might just say whatever was in her 
head at that time. The judge went on to explain that it is clear from the rules that he 
should ‘encourage, allow and enable’ a person who ‘hasn’t got capacity’ to express 
views to the judge as much as possible. Yet LC did not attend court, nor did she meet 
with the judge privately. LC was ultimately found to lack capacity to litigate, consent 
to sex and marry. 
 LC was not physically present in court despite expressing (through others) a 
sustained, albeit inconsistent, wish to attend. LC could have explained her 
understanding of sexual relations, how she experienced them with GK, the 
voluntariness within which she entered their marriage, and her general wishes and 
feelings. Furthermore, she could have given an insight into the impact of any court 
decision on her life. Despite case law requiring that people with disabilities participate 
in decisions, this has not sufficiently taken hold in the cultural practice of the COP. 
Whilst rules have been implemented to increase participation, the data obtained 
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suggests they have so far had limited impact in improving P’s embodied presence in 
sex/marriage/contact cases.  
 
Voice and impaired credibility in Court of Protection 
proceedings 
 
In addition to concern over P’s limited presence, P rarely gave witness evidence. 
There are many aspects of a case for which P could provide evidence, for example on 
her wishes and feelings, understanding of specific issues or to enable the judge to gain 
an overall picture. Every person is assumed to be a competent witness  unless they fall 
within certain categories.7  In A County Council v (1) AB (2) BB (3) CB [2016] 
EWCOP 41 Rogers J affirmed the civil law test for competence to give evidence as 
whether the witness would understand (a) the solemnity of the occasion and (b) the 
responsibility to tell the truth. In relation to the solemnity of the occasion, the witness 
must appreciate the nature and obligation of an oath or affirmation.8 In relation to the 
second part, the court’s focus is on whether or not the adult understands the moral 
duty to speak the truth. However, case law suggests no inquiry is usually made into 
the understanding of such moral duty, suggesting it is interpreted broadly.9 Therefore 
whilst rules do apply, proving incompetence to testify is a high threshold and in many 
cases it should not have been difficult to show that P was competent to give evidence. 
However, in my observations these rules were not the primary obstacle to P having a 
voice. The rules were not expressly discussed and no findings on competence were 
made in any case observed. Instead, I suggest the culture of the court process led to 
P’s absent voice.   
 
Inherent vulnerability  
 
A cultural stereotype that mentally disabled adults are especially inherently 
vulnerable permeated COP proceedings. This stereotype of vulnerability led to P’s 
resulting lack of credibility as a knowledge giver. This cultural understanding of Ps in 
general was reinforced in specific cases through the language and behaviour of COP 
participants. 
Firstly, the language of inherent vulnerability was prevalent throughout the 
COP cases observed and case files reviewed. For example, in C Borough Council v 
(1) DY (2) B Council, the council’s position statement stated that DY had an IQ of 47 
and a learning difficulty and ‘[a]s such she is particularly vulnerable and in need of 
substantial support in all but the most elementary aspects of daily life in order to 
maintain herself safely.’ This shows that DY’s vulnerability was linked to her mental 
functioning (an inherent vulnerability), albeit according to the local authority the 
matter was before the court because of concerns about an abusive relationship (a 
situational vulnerability). Similarly, in OD v R City Council, the psychiatric report 
stated that OD ‘has no understanding of his disability and vulnerability and need for 
positive contact and care in either the short or longer term’. The expert further stated 
‘… OD is vulnerable to exploitation, this vulnerability is largely a result of his lack of 
capacity for sexual relationships...’ Again, this related OD’s vulnerability back to an 
internal characteristic. This was reinforced in Y County Council v (1) LC (2) GK (3) 
SC, where LC’s vulnerability was mentioned on multiple occasions by participants (in 
excess of 12 times at the final hearing). It was suggested that LC’s naïve, trusting 
nature, alleged to be the result of her disability, made her vulnerable. The language of 
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inherent vulnerability by reference to LC’s disabilities was focused upon in contrast 
to addressing the relationship between LC and GK as the reason for the case being at 
court. LC was situationally vulnerable within a specific context, to the alleged 
exploitation by her husband. Yet the legal representatives and judge repeatedly linked 
her vulnerability back to her disability, highlighting the focus on inherent features.  
Secondly, this understanding of inherent vulnerability was present through the 
framing of expert evidence. For example, psychiatric evidence was taken from Dr Y 
on LC’s capacity to give live evidence. Dr Y was equivocal on LC’s capacity, 
essentially explaining that it would depend how the questions were put to her. Dr Y 
also explained that ‘it’s difficult to know her understanding of the truth’ and that she 
would need some evidence to support the fact it’s the truth because ‘she is too 
trusting’. She explained that ‘most people I see are very worried about court cases’ 
and ‘scared about the law’ but that ‘She [LC] wasn’t worried about the court and that 
it might result in outcomes that she didn’t want.’ The expert said this ‘demonstrated 
her [LC’s] trust in authority’. However, as was suggested by Counsel for LC’s 
husband, her trust in the authority of the court arguably strengthened LC’s 
understanding of the requirement to tell the truth rather than undermined it; she 
appreciated the importance of giving evidence to a court, which could have lifelong 
consequences for her.  
Dr Y also explained that LC was very keen to please. She explained that girls 
with autism are keen to fit in and that LC had a tendency to copy others. These 
descriptions constructed LC as not credible because, as a result of her disability, she 
was vulnerable to saying anything to fit in. Similarly, LC’s social worker explained 
that LC would often laugh or change the subject.  The evidence that LC was likely to 
change her mind and give different answers came through in the judge’s comment 
that from what he had heard LC might just say whatever is in her head at that time. 
These comments worked to reduce LC’s credibility and attribute it to inherent factors 
such as her mental disability, pre-emptively silencing her voice. No finding was made 
about LC’s capacity to give evidence and she did not provide oral evidence because, 
after numerous discussions, her counsel decided not to call her as a witness. This was 
disappointing given that it was the only case observed which went to a full trial. Most 
cases never got that far as agreement between the parties was reached outside of 
court, typically in favour of P lacking capacity. This shows the value in analysing the 
data from this case because it was one of the few cases in my sample that reached a 
full trial. This highlights that it is not formal legal barriers that limit P’s participation 
but the cultural barriers exemplified in the behaviour of the participants. 
Thirdly, silencing P, through framing her as especially inherently vulnerable, 
also resulted from age comparisons with children. The silencing of children is well 
documented (James et al., 2004; James, 2008: 61; Brammer and Cooper, 2011) and as 
Murris explains, ‘credibility deficit is related to age’ (Murris, 2013: 248). Therefore 
the COP discourse which infantilised adults helped support a generalised opinion that 
P was unable to give evidence because she could not be relied upon to be truthful 
because of her childlike nature. This testimonial injustice led to her voice not being 
heard. Dr Y gave evidence describing LC as ‘very childlike’ and that she functions at 
the age of 7 or 8. It is concerning that such age comparisons are being made as they 
only impact negatively on assessments of capacity (Herring, 2010). It is perhaps not 
surprising that if Dr Y viewed LC as comparable to a child that she concluded LC 
lacked capacity to consent to sex and marriage. In fact, Dr Y went on to expressly link 
the two by stating that it was her understanding that it was illegal to have sex with 
someone who functions at the age of 7 or 8. Furthermore, reference was made to LC’s 
Accepted version of article, not to be used or reproduced without author’s permission 
 11
relationship with her teddies in excess of 17 times throughout the final hearing. 
Whilst on some occasions this was used to highlight flaws in LC’s husband’s case 
that he did not realise that LC had a learning disability until some time in to their 
relationship, at other times it was used to question LC’s credibility. This attempt at 
silencing through infantalisation constructed LC as vulnerable and, as a result, 
undermined her credibility before she had the opportunity to speak.  
Infantilising mentally disabled adults exacerbates their perceived inherent 
vulnerability resulting in the silencing of their voice. However, Shoemaker gives three 
important distinctions between mentally disabled adults and children (Shoemaker, 
2010). Firstly, mentally disabled adults are physically more mature than children. 
This will often mean they have had intimate and other relationships, sexual 
experiences and been able to travel alone. This was the case for LC who had a job, a 
high degree of independence and was in a sexual relationship. Secondly, the impact of 
physical and social factors should not be underestimated because they often lead to 
the adult developing greater emotional maturity as a result of life experience. For 
example, LC had the experience of a serious adult relationship. Finally, they have 
greater cognitive maturity than children of a comparable developmental age. This 
means that because the adult has been at their level of development for a longer time 
period than children would be (because children move on to the next stage in 
adolescence) they have experienced that level of functioning on a daily basis for many 
years. As a result they have a more developed understanding of their own abilities, 
limits, likes and dislikes than a child would have at such an age. Therefore whilst Dr 
Y described LC as comparable to a 7 or 8 year old, this should be an unpersuasive 
comparison given that a young child would not be able to do the things LC had done 
according to my observations, such as be in regular employment, travel, attend 
college and have a sexual relationship. Therefore drawing parallels between the two 
undermines the important distinctions that law draws between adults and children.  
Disabled people have long been understood as especially vulnerable, which 
has led to the silencing of their voice. This is partly because the logical, rational and 
predominantly professional voice that dominates legal proceedings is not typical of 
many people, including those with complex mental disabilities. This is, of course, 
why legal representation is so essential. However, when the court focuses on the 
reasons why P’s voice should not be heard, ‘the law produces the very subjects it 
claims to protect’ (Scott-Hill, 2002: 401). It does so by allowing the evidence to 
construct P as inherently vulnerable and therefore unable to give evidence. 
 
Situational vulnerability  
 
As well as the attribution of vulnerability to inherent factors, there was evidence that 
those involved in proceedings were concerned that P was situationally vulnerable, 
meaning that participants perceived P to be vulnerable within the courtroom. Whilst 
situational vulnerability does not automatically relate to P’s disability, I suggest that P 
was viewed as especially situationally vulnerable in the courtroom, rather than 
viewing her as situationally vulnerable in the way other witnesses are. Viewing P in 
this way led to her exclusion in her capacity as a giver of knowledge.  
One case I observed where P was characterised as situationally vulnerable was 
T City Council v CY. The case concerned a 49 year old woman’s capacity to decide on 
residence, care and contact. CY was described as having a mild to moderate learning 
disability and emotionally unstable personality disorder. The case was brought due to 
concerns about CY’s relationship with her partner, SB, and her heavy alcohol 
Accepted version of article, not to be used or reproduced without author’s permission 
 12
consumption. It was also noted there were previous concerns about CY being sexually 
exploited in exchange for alcohol. In addition to the capacity declarations, CY was 
also subject to a Deprivation of Liberty (DOL) under Schedule A1 MCA. CY 
objected to being placed under a DOL and was not happy with the restrictions. 
However, CY’s litigation friend accepted the expert evidence that she lacked capacity 
and the final hearing proceeded with agreement. Unusually, the judge spoke with CY 
in the courtroom, with her representatives present, but without the other parties (local 
authority and CY’s parents). I was excluded from these discussions before the case 
commenced, which lasted for approximately five minutes. When CY came out of the 
courtroom she said that she did not want to go in for the rest of the hearing because 
the judge is ‘going up top now’, implying that she did not want to be there when he 
was sitting in the typical judge’s position, in contrast to him sitting at her level during 
their informal discussion. CY left the building and the other parties and I were invited 
into court. 
On entering court, the judge explained that he understood that CY was quite 
frightened so he thought that speaking to her separately would be more appropriate. 
This is a clear and commendable example of a situational response to her perceived 
inherent vulnerability. He explained that he kept a note of what she told him and what 
he asked her. He explained that it was not to be evidence in the formal sense. He did 
not expand on what he meant by this. On reflection he must have been referring to 
COPr 95(e). Yet it was not clear that CY lacked competence to give evidence, nor 
why such informal measures could not have been taken alongside swearing her in and 
thereby enabling her evidence to be given greater weight. There was also an 
attendance note in the court file that CY said to her litigation friend that she was 
frightened of court, but following lots of questions and answers she said ‘I’m going to 
do it, going to go’ and ‘gave thumbs up’ and ‘seemed quite enthused’. This suggests 
that what CY needed, like many others, was reassurance, information and support to 
facilitate her attendance. 
Many reasons for P’s limited participation can be attributed to concerns about 
situational vulnerability. It is well established that giving evidence can be stressful, 
both for ‘vulnerable’ people and others (Hunter et al., 2013; Henderson, 2016). That 
is not to minimise any distress that somebody with a mental disability may 
additionally experience. Yet Dr Y explained that LC’s attitude to the court process 
was ‘frivolous’ and that she was a ‘robust character’ who can ‘bounce back from 
things’. Therefore, it should not be assumed that a person’s disability will make the 
court experience especially more difficult for them. In fact, in some cases P may 
experience less anxiety if she has limited experience of the cultural authority of law 
compared with others. A lack of access to epistemic goods such as education (Fricker, 
2013: 1318) is arguably a greater barrier for people with mental disabilities given 
their poor educational experiences and reduced access to resources. Of course P is, in 
many cases, situationally vulnerable; if she does not know what to expect then she 
may express concerns about attending court. However, situational vulnerability 
should be addressed in terms that address that specific vulnerability rather than not 
hearing her voice at all.    
 
Rejection of P’s voice and impaired credibility  
 
Finally, I briefly explore the testimonial injustice that occurred where P had a voice 
but it was rejected. Deflated credibility judgements involve rejecting a person’s 
knowledge when it is heard, as well as not hearing it (Wanderer, 2012). So far I have 
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set out the reasons why P’s voice was absent, primarily because of her perceived 
especial vulnerability. However, I now consider two cases where P had a voice but 
her evidence was not viewed as credible, highlighting that voice alone does not 
guarantee credibility.  
I take as a starting point that the subject of a case has a basic level of 
credibility to speak. That is not to say that P’s evidence should always be attributed 
greater credibility than others, but that most Ps are still likely to have an important 
contribution to make (Donnelly, 2009: 11-12). This links to wider questions about the 
balance between expert evidence and evidence from experience, something I do not 
have the space to explore here. However, mental capacity law proceedings concern 
individuals who, according to s 1 MCA, are assumed to have capacity until there is 
evidence that they lack it and, under s 4 (6) MCA, weight should be given to P’s 
wishes and feelings even where P lacks capacity. Therefore, irrespective of how the 
balance between expert and experiential evidence is resolved in an individual case, it 
is essential that P has an opportunity to be heard in relation to decisions which affect 
her life.  
CY’s case, discussed in the previous section, is the only case where P attended 
the final hearing, therefore giving her a voice and embodied presence. It was not 
formal witness testimony in that it was unsworn, but it was still ‘evidence’ as it 
formed part of the information before the judge. At the start of the hearing, the judge 
explained that CY told him that she did not like ‘DOLS’, because she did not like 
people watching her one to one and she also did not like going out with staff. He also 
said that she did not understand the reason for the ‘DOLS’. CY was asked by counsel 
why she was at court and she responded that she did not know. The judge explained it 
was because he would be making a decision about her living arrangements. She was 
asked if she wanted to stay for the hearing and she said no and then asked to leave, 
which the judge described as ‘understandable’. Despite CY being physically present 
and having a voice, the judge authorised the DOL against her wishes and declared that 
she lacked the capacity to litigate and to decide on residence and care. The judge 
noted that the expert evidence about CY’s capacity to decide on contact was ‘not 
sufficient’. I took this to mean that the presumption of capacity under s 1 (2) MCA 
had not been rebutted. The judge then explained that restricting CY’s contact with her 
partner through her lack of capacity to decide on her care needs ‘circumvents the 
entire problem’. This meant that CY was to be subject to a care plan, which restricted 
and monitored her contact with SB on the basis that he could not properly care for 
her, despite her expressed dislike of being watched and the finding that she had 
capacity to decide on contact.  
In another case, P County Council v SE, SE did not have an embodied 
presence. However, her strong views were put before the court through her 
representatives. The case concerned an 80 year old woman with dementia who lived 
in her own home for a number of years with her partner, TM. The COP proceedings 
started following police attendance at the property, where they raised concerns about 
SE’s living conditions. SE raised no concerns and said she was happy with TM 
looking after her. SE was subsequently admitted to hospital in a confused and 
disorientated state. It appeared that SE had not seen her GP for five years although 
she had some contact with district nurses. SE also had a daughter, LM, who it is said 
she had not seen for five years as TM did not want LM to go to the flat. The case 
proceeded as the social workers had concerns about SE’s living conditions and TM’s 
ability to provide her with suitable care. There were concerns about TM’s 
mistreatment of SE, although no findings of fact were made.  
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Four months prior to the final hearing, SE was moved to a care home, which 
both SE and TM opposed. In the final hearing the judge held that SE lacked the 
capacity to make decisions about her care and residence and to manage her property 
and affairs. However, it was held that SE did not lack capacity to decide on contact or 
sexual relations. The judge went on to explain that SE’s wishes and feelings included 
her repeated expression of her wish to return home and be cared for by SE. The judge 
noted that at the time of the final hearing that remained SE’s wish. Furthermore, at a 
meeting between SE, her litigation friend and solicitor, SE was informed that the 
contents of an independent social work report indicated that it was not feasible for her 
to return home, to which SE stated ‘well I could just die’ and made reference to 
cutting her throat. The judge, in referring to this incident, noted that the solicitor and 
litigation friend were ‘unclear’ about SE’s wishes and feelings at that point. The judge 
further explained that the litigation friend had raised concern about SE’s deterioration 
following the last hearing. SE had become immobile, in need of hoisting and feeding 
by care home staff. In contrast, SE had previously been described as chatty and had 
had a good sense of humour. Despite SE’s clear wishes and feelings being expressed 
to the court through others the judge held that it was in SE’s best interests to remain in 
the care home. 
Despite CY, and to a lesser extent SE, having a voice before the court, neither 
of their evidence was given sufficient weight to outweigh the other evidence before 
the court. The importance of providing sworn evidence should therefore not be 
underestimated in contrast to giving information to the court or having your wishes 
conveyed by others. However, in CY’s case, even if her evidence had been sworn, the 
cultural stereotype of disabled adults being especially vulnerable and therefore 
lacking credibility may still have undermined the weight given to her evidence.   
 
Facilitating Participation of Vulnerable Adults  
 
Finally, I consider ways in which the testimonial injustice identified could be 
addressed. More recently, the favoured way of securing participation throughout legal 
proceedings has been through special measures. Special measures are ways of 
alleviating the anxiety associated with giving evidence, for example through the 
witness giving evidence through live link. Such measures preserve the weight as 
evidence will generally be sworn, but attempt to make the experience less stressful. 
Special measures have been in place in the family and criminal courts for some time 
(Burton et al., 2007; Brammer and Cooper, 2011) and have been recommended in 
COP proceedings (Series et al., 2017: 131-132). However, in other contexts there 
have remained barriers to the use of special measures in practice (Fairclough, 2017). 
Certain special measures may be more useful than others in the COP. For example, 
familiarisation visits to court prior to the hearing might be useful in helping to 
alleviate any fears P might have and enable them to have their questions answered. 
Whilst special measures can be useful in addressing the situational vulnerability of the 
courtroom, I have two concerns with advocating special measures as the solution to 
this problem. 
Witnesses in the COP can give evidence remotely under COPr 98. This is not 
something I saw used, and one court clerk indicated that live links, when used, are 
‘not the same’. This articulates my first concern. Using live link means the witness 
has limited physical presence in court. Yet, as discussed earlier, the interaction 
between bodies and environment can provide many advantages which may be lost 
through the giving of evidence remotely. Whilst there is a movement towards court 
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digitalisation, the possibility that giving evidence remotely may lack the impact of 
giving evidence in the courtroom should not be overlooked. As I have emphasised the 
value of embodiment in this article, solutions that reduce bodily presence need to be 
carefully considered.  
My second concern is that focusing on special measures as the solution here 
risks reinforcing the assumption that there is something especially vulnerable about P. 
Whilst special measures can be beneficial, alone they will achieve little to rectify the 
testimonial injustice towards P unless special measures are routinely used by a range 
of different witnesses. This is a similar risk in criminal and family law proceedings as 
judgements about credibility may also be made about those who use special measures. 
By advocating special measures as the answer to testimonial injustice, P may continue 
to be viewed as especially vulnerable which will continue to impact on her credibility 
as an evidence-giver. 
 
A rebuttable presumption that P will give evidence  
 
I propose that the COPr should be amended to include a rebuttable presumption that P 
should give evidence in COP proceedings. This means that it would be assumed that P 
would provide evidence unless it was established that she was not competent. For 
incompetence to testify to be proven, P would have to be shown not to understand the 
solemnity of the occasion nor the responsibility to tell the truth. If the COP found she 
lacked competence, bearing in mind the high threshold, P would not be able to give 
sworn evidence. Evidence from a competent P could be submitted through a witness 
statement, given orally, or through special measures. This rule change would focus 
participants on securing P’s evidence because it would have to be presumed that she 
would give evidence. Under this presumption P would not be compelled to give 
evidence against her will as her evidence could simply be a statement that she does 
not wish to be involved.  
A central purpose of this rule change is to help challenge persistent attitudes 
which characterise P as especially vulnerable and therefore unable to give evidence. 
Whilst it has been suggested elsewhere that Ps will rarely be competent to give 
evidence (Charles, 2016; Series et al., 2017), I suggest this assumption is premature. 
As highlighted above, in no observed case was a determination made about an 
individual P’s competence to give evidence; it was simply assumed. Instead, a clear 
presumption articulated in the COPr that P should give evidence would help to 
challenge the current cultural presumption of incompetence.   
A presumption in favour of giving evidence should also result in more 
situational responses to vulnerabilities identified. For example, if P expressed a fear 
of court, this would have to be addressed through special measures rather than 
excluding P. Some may argue this risks placing P in a stressful situation. However, 
sworn evidence need not be given in court, despite the embodied benefits of doing so. 
Furthermore, as emphasised above, P should not be compelled to give evidence 
against her wishes. Yet, importantly, any concerns should be addressed through 
amending the situation within which P would give evidence rather than assuming she 
is not competent to do so. In addressing concerns about putting P in a harmful 
situation it must be remembered that it is often in P’s interests to have her voice 
heard. An analysis of case law shows that cases where P had a voice and embodied 
presence, albeit usually by the judge going to meet her, often resulted in P’s wishes 
being respected. 10  Of course, respecting P’s wishes might not always be in P’s 
interests, particularly where there is abuse, as in many cases I observed. However, 
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from a testimonial injustice perspective, placing P’s evidence at the heart of a case is 
essential. Even if P’s evidence does not change the outcome, it is P who will have to 
live with the consequences for the rest of her life. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Using original data I have highlighted P’s routine absence from COP proceedings. 
This is despite moves under the ECHR and other jurisdictions to facilitate 
participation. I have framed P’s absence as a form of testimonial injustice 
underpinned by attitudes which view mentally disabled adults as especially 
vulnerable. Whilst I have no doubt that, in some cases, P can be described as 
vulnerable, the cultural stereotype of inherent vulnerability is concerning. 
Furthermore, attributing P’s vulnerability to the existence of a mental disorder rather 
than her situational context works to culturally exclude P from proceedings and limits 
her participation in decision-making. Such attitudes undermine P’s credibility in the 
exceptional cases where she does give evidence. 
There remain barriers to meaningful participation, including the culture of the 
court, judicial and professional attitudes and the court set-up. I briefly explored the 
role that special measures might play in addressing these barriers. Further research is 
undoubtedly needed to investigate the impact on the perception of evidence when 
special measures are used. In particular, the use of special measures that exclude P’s 
physical presence in court raise concerns and require a stronger evidence base before 
they are routinely advocated. Whatever the solutions adopted, it is a matter of justice 
that Ps are given the opportunity to participate in COP proceedings and have their 
knowledge heard. The COP makes decisions that will fundamentally impact on P’s 
life and therefore, intrinsically and instrumentally, there is enormous value in P 
having her own voice and bodily presence before the court.   
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